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NOTE AND COMMENT

THE RuaE AGAINST PERMUITItS AS APPLIED ro OvrioNs.-Does the
rule against perpetuities render unlimited options void? This is a question
which the English courts answered affirmatively some thirty-five years
ago; new aspects of the question have been frequently presented to those
courts since that time, and conclusions not easy to reconcile have been
reached. It is believed that the present status of the law in England is
that an option is like any other interest in land, void if it may arise at too
remote a time, otherwise not. This conclusion is based on the decision in
Borland's Trustees v. Steel Bros. & Co. [ipoi] I Ch. D. 279, sustaining an
option of a corporation to buy or call in its stock at any time; and Southeastern Ry. Co. v. Associated Portland Cement Mfgrs. [1910] I Ch. D. 12,
sustaining a reservation of the right to tunnel under a railway at any
time, reserved in the grant of the right of way. The American courts
are just getting into the muddle, and it remains for the future to tell what
will come of it, and, if the doctrine is accepted, how our courts can reconcile
it with our kindred decisions since the first settlement. The most extreme
view yet advanced is in a recent West Virginia case. 'Defendants sold two
parcels of land, reserving to themselves and their heirs the right at any
time to purchase the minerals under one piece at $I an acre, and to
purchase the minerals under the' other at the same price at any time
within 99 years. Plaintiffs, claiming title under these deeds, sued to have
the options declared void and the cloud removed from the title. A -decree
for defendants was reversed on appeal, and decree according to the
prayer ordered. Woodall v. Bruen (W. Va. I915), 85 S. E. 170.
This -decision is an extension of the doctrine of Starcher v. Duty, 6i W.
Va. 373, 56 S. E. 527, 9 L. R. A. N. S. 913, 123 Am. St. Rep. 990, in
which the court held a grant of a similar option void. TPhe -whole doctrine
is based on the decision of the English Court of Appeal in London S. W.
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Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, holding a reservation of a right to
purchase at any time-void, followed by Woodall v. Clifton [1905] 2 Ch.
D. 257, holding a grant to a tenant in.a lease for 99 years of the right
to buy at any time within the term of the lease void. These. decisions have
been followed in the case of Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 34 92 AtL 312,
holding a grant of the option to purchase 'the surface at any time, as
incident to a grant of minerals in the same deed, void. The above decisions
have been repudiated in two courts: Blakeman v.-Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68
Pac. 687, sustaining an option to purchase in a lease for 2o years under
a statute that makes the perpetuity period lives and infancy only; and
Hollander v. Central Metals Co., iog Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442, in which spedfic
performance of a covenant in a lease to convey the reversion to the lessee
or.his assigns if the lessee or his assigns should demand it and tender
the price during the term of the lease was decreed against the assignee of
the reversion at the suit of the assignee of the term. Winsor. v. Mills,
157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352, has been cited to the contrary, but clearly
is not, as that decision was merely that an option to purchase whenever
the owner or his heirs should offer the property for sale be decreed void.
Such an option is clearly future; and an option to arise at an indefinite
future time 'would surely be no better than an absolute estate to arise
under similar circumstances.
We have now reviewed all the American cases on the question which we
-have.discovered, and the principal English ones. The court in the case of
Woodall v. Bruen, above, declared that it is "committed" to the doctrine
generally, indeed universally, accepted in America, that possibility of
reverter after a base -fee (so long as, until, &c.) and a possibility of forfeiture by breach of a condition subsequent are not covered by the rule
against perpetuities; from which it would follow that a grant to another
and his 'heirs until the grantor, his 'heirs or assigns should tender $i per
acre to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, or a grant upon the express
condition that the grant should be void and the grantor or -his heirs might
enter and re-possess themselves of their former estate if the grantee or
his assigns should fail to reconvey upon tender of $i per acre at any time
by the grantor or his heirs, would reserve a valid possibility of reverter
or condition subsequent, and upon happening of the event the grantor
or 'his 'heirs might recover the property at any remote period. But the
court holds that an option to repurchase at any time violates the rule
against perpetuities. That is certainly a distinction such as would pose
the understanding of any man but a lawyer. There is no substance there;
whatever of distinction exists is mere form. But the rule against perpetuities is a rule of public policy. If a disposition is permitted in one
form it should -be permitted in another.
'In this connection the language of- the "father of equity jurisprudence",
who may with equal propriety be called the father of the rule against perpetuities, is so peculiarly appropriate that'a quotation of it from the case which
first formulated the rule is necessary. Lord 'Chancellor NOTrING]HEAM said:
"Another thing there is, 'whith I take to 'be unanswerable, and gather it
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from what fell from my Lord Chief Justice Pemberton;

and when I

can answer that case, I shall 'be able to answer myself very much for
that -which I am doing. Suppose the proviso had been thus penned, 'and
if Thomas die without issue male,-living Henry, so that the earldom of
Arundel descend upon Henry, then the term of two hundred years limited
to -him and his issue shall utterly cease and termine, but then a new term
of two hundred years shall arise and be limited to the same trustees for
the benefit 6f Charles in tail,' this he thinks might have been well enough,
and attained the end and intention of the -family, 'because then this would
not 'be a remainder in, tail upon a tail, but a new term created. Pray let
us so resolve--cases here that they may stand with the reason of mankind,
Shall that be reason here that is not
when they are debated abroad.
reason in any part of the world besides? I would fain know the difference
why I may not raise a new springing trust upon the same term as well
as a new springing term upon the same trust; that is such a chicanery of law as will be laughed at all over the Christian world." Further on in
the same case the Lord Chancellor said: "All men are agreed (and my
Lord Chief Justice told us particularly how) that there is a 1way in
which it might be done, only they do not like this way; and I desire no
better argument in the world to maintain my opinion than that." Duke of
Norfolk's Case, 3 Chan. Cas. i.
If the decision in Woodall v. Bruen be sound it must follow that
all mortgages not expressly limited to be foreclosed within the perpetuity term, all provisions in articles of incorporation permitting the
corporation to levy assessments on stock or retire stock on terms, all
options not expressly limited to the perpetuity term (which in most states
.would not permit even one day, the term being lives and infancy), and
all wills, devises, and bequests, are utterly and absolutely void. To discern
why this would render all wills bVoid it is only necessary to remember that
all persons to whom anything is given by will have an option to accept or
reject the gift, which option may be exercised, by the donee himself or
by his -heir after 'him. Before -we pull the heavens down; let us Sit and
J.R. R.
think a little.
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